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coerce, so that the proceeding was one of criminal contempt. One who
defies public authority, be that one an unincorporated association of laboring men, an individual, or a corporation, and who willfully disobeys a
court order, the court said, must pay the penalty. The very purpose of a
writ of replevin, the court held, is to effect a delivery of the property to
the plaintiff and requires the sheriff to take actual physical possession
thereof. The nature of the duty of the court's officer, it was further said,
is not to be determined by the parties to the writ, much less by third
parties such as the defendants. The nature of the charge, the court explained, was not one for disobedience of a court order but for resistance
17
to and interference with the execution of process.
The case also seems to have aspects of mass picketing which the state
courts have jurisdiction to enjoin if the peace appears to be threatened.
EDWIN R. TEPLE

LANDLORD AND TENANT
Because of the lack of significant opinions rendered on Landlord and
Tenant during the period covered by this survey, Mr. Marshall I. Nurenberg has not submitted an article this year.
THE EDITORS

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS :
The recent cases involving municipal corporations have arisen in
various areas including: the definition of a "conflict" between a state
statute and a municipal ordinance; the determination of an applicant's
rights in zoning; and, the situations of municipal tort liability. The litigation which will be discussed can be classified into that which involves
the state and the municipal corporation and that which involves the individual and the municipal corporation.
STATE V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

When is a Municipal Ordinance in Conflict With a State Statute?
Municipalities in Ohio are authorized to adopt local police, sanitary,
and other regulations by virtue of Constitutional Home Rule and are subject to no limitations except that such ordinances must not conflict with
17. Judge Bell dissented on the ground that the facts in the record gave rise to a reasonable
doubt as to the presence of the intent necessary to prove a criminal contempt.
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general laws.1 The test for determining a "conflict" was established by
the Ohio Supreme Court in Village of Struthers v. Sokol:'
[T]he test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the
statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.3
In City of Cleveland v. Betts4 the Ohio Supreme Court said that this was
not the exclusive test and that a conflict also existed when an ordinance
contravened the expressed policy of the state.
Three recent cases have carefully defined a "conflict" and alleviated
some of the doubts that might have been caused by the Betts case. In
City of Akron v. Williams5 the defendant was convicted under an ordinance which prohibited the possession of firearms by a person who had
been convicted of a felony. His contention that the ordinance was invalid because it was in conflict with state statutes' was upheld by the
Municipal Court of Akron. But the Court of Appeals for Summit
County reversed the decision, citing favorably the test established in Village of Struthers v. Sokol.7 The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's appeal.8
The test established in the Sokol case was referred to by the Lucas
County Court of Appeals in City of Toledo v. Best.' There the defendant
was charged with the violation of the Toledo ordinance which prohibits
driving while intoxicated. The court would not accept the defendant's
contention that the ordinance was invalid because it was in conflict with
Ohio Revised Code sections 4511.19 and 4511.99(B). The conflict,
argued the defendant, resulted from a variation in the penalties prescribed.
* This article was written by Richard H. Kraushaar with the guidance of Samuel Sonenfield,
formerly Associate Professor of Law at Western Reserve Law School.
1.

OutO CONST. art. XVIII,

§ 3.

2. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
3. Ibid. For a more detailed discussion, see Blume, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio: The
New Look, 11 WEsT. R s. L Rav. 538, 542, 552 (1960).
4. 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958). In this case the ordinance defined the
carrying of a concealed weapon as a misdemeanor while the statutory enactment made the
identical offense a felony. Under the Sokol test the ordinance did not permit what the statute
prohibited, but the court declared the ordinance invalid.
5. 113 Ohio App. 293 (1960), appeal dismissed, 172 Ohio St. 287 (1961).
6. OHIO REv. CODE § 2923.01. "No person shall carry a pistol, bowie knife, dirk, or other
dangerous weapon concealed .... " The court of appeals pointed out that this statute dealt
only with what weapons could be carried, not with the problem referred to by the ordinance
of who could possess the weapons. The court also disregarded the defendant's argument thatthe state had pre-empted the field by legislation on the subject of possessing and carrying
firearms.
7. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923). In City of Akron v. Williams, 113 Ohio App.
293 (1960), the ordinance did not prohibit that which the statute permitted, because the
statute did not legislate who could carry firearms.
8. City of Akron v. Williams, 172 Ohio St. 287 (1961).
9. 113 Ohio App. 380, aff'd, 172 Ohio St. 371 (1961).
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by the ordinance and the statute." The court of appeals citing the Sokol
case, held that an ordinance is not in conflict with a general law merely
because different penalties are provided for the same acts."
Finally, the Sokol test was reaffirmed in City of Akron v. Criner.'
Here the defendant was found guilty in Akron Municipal Court of violating an Akron ordinance prohibiting intoxication. The court gave no
credence to the defendant's contention that the ordinance was in conflict
with Ohio Revised Code section 715.55, which also prohibits intoxication. The defendant argued that there was a conflict since the statute
ordered punishment for intoxication when a person disturbed the good
order and quiet and the ordinance did not mention this element. The
court cited the Sokol case and held the ordinance valid.'3
These cases reaffirm the importance of the Sokol test in determining
when an ordinance is in conflict with a statute under article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution and alleviate some of the doubts which
might have been caused by the Betts case.' 4 These cases are important
as they exhibit a favorable attitude by the courts toward municipal home
rule. For all practical purposes, the courts, by promulgating an all-encompassing definition of a "conflict" in this context, could have minimized the significance of the constitutional grant.
INDIVIDUAL V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

The two areas of conflict between the rights of an individual and the
acts of a municipality are in zoning and the municipality's tort liability.
In the former, it appears that the individual must adhere to formal pro10. Ohio Revised Code section 4511.99 (B) states "[NJo court shall suspend the first
three days of any sentence provided for under this section." The Toledo Municipal Code
states that a violation of a municipal ordinance relating to driving while intoxicated is punishable by ".... a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or imprisonment in the county
or municipal jail for more than six months . . . " The conflict arises because imprisonment
under this municipal ordinance is governed by Ohio Revised Code section 2947.13, which
permits a court to ".... suspend such sentence in whole or in part... " Therefore, the defendant contended that the ordinance permitting suspension of the entire sentence conflicted
with the state statute involving the same offense but providing that no court could suspend
the first three days of the sentence.
11. City of Toledo v. Best, 113 Ohio App. 380, 383 (1960), aff'd, 172 Ohio St. 371
(1961). For a more detailed discussion of this proposition, see Sonenfield, Survey of Ohio
Law - Municipal Corporations, 12 WEST. RES. L. REV. 531, 536-38 (1961).
12. 112 Ohio App. 191, 175 N.E.2d 746 (1960).
13. The court went even further in this case, stating that the state statute was "needless legislation," since the municipality under constitutional home rule was empowered to legislate
on the matter. Id. at 193, 175 N.E.2d at 748. It is difficult to determine the basis for the
court's decision - the lack of conflict under the Sokol test or the statute's interference in the
realm of municipal home rule.
14. These cases by no means indicate the rejection by the courts of the test in the Betts case.
In fact, no mention was made of this point in the opinions discussed. It seems reasonable to
predict that the test expounded by the Betts case will be adopted when the facts of a case more
clearly interfere with state policy. These cases are noted to rid the practicing attorney of any
notion that the Betts case overruled the "conflict" test in the Sokol case.
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cedure or lose his right to use his property as he wishes; while in the latter,
the municipality's tort liability has been expanded to protect the individual to a greater extent
Zoning

-

Determination of Applicant's Rights

The Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed in Gibson v. City of Oberlin'
the general rule as to when an applicant's rights to use his property are
fixed. It stated that the rights are fixed by the provisions of the zoning
ordinance as of the time he perfects an application for a building permit
which is in conformity to the ordinance as it stands, and not by the ordinance as it is subsequently changed. This general rule was recently referred to in State ex rel. Mar-Well Incorporatedv. Dodge" by the Summit County Court of Appeals. However, this rule as applied to the facts
in the Mar-Well case presents a problem for the potential land-user that
must be carefully probed.' 7
In the Mar-Well case the applicant had his allotment plat approved
and recorded and had done some grading and other improvement before
'the zoning change was made. The court said that these actions did not
irrevocably fix the rights of the parties so long as an application for use
of the premises had not been filed."8
9 and in the MarIt appears from the decisions in Smith v. Juillerat"
Well case that the applicant must not err in his procedure to vest his
rights in the land, for he will not be protected by the general rule expressed in the Gibson case. The courts do not seem sympathetic to the
applicant's arguments that his rights can vest without formal application
or that he has perfected a prior nonconforming use by his actions. There
is an important question that remains to be answered. Can the applicant
by any acts other than filing a formal application for a building permit
vest his rights to a use in the land? The answer according to Smith and
Mar-Well is in the negative, but it seems that the courts might modify
their attitude if the applicant sustains a certain degree of hardship2
15. 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960). See discussion in Sonenfield, Survey of Ohio
Law - Municipal Corporations,12 WEST. RES. L REV. 531, 539-40 (1961).
16. 113 Ohio App. 118, 177 N.E.2d 515 (1960). See also discussion in Constitutional
Law section, p. 449 supra.
17. The problem of defining when an individual's rights to use the land become vested was
previously examined in Smith v. Juillerat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 NY.2d 611 (1954). In
that case the applicant held a license which permitted strip mining. A zoning resolution that
would have prohibited this action was pending when the license was issued. Although the
applicant expended money on mining operations, the court said that the applicant had no
vested right prior to the effective date of the zoning resolution.
18. State ex rel. Mar-Well, Inc. v. Dodge, 113 Ohio App. 118, 122, 177 N.E.2d 515, 519

(1960).
19. See note 17 supra.
20. If the applicant suffers great hardship, the courts may still refuse to hold that the applicant's rights were vested without formal application, but grant him relief on the basis of a
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A recent 1961 case, State ex rel. Martin Land Development Company v. Clepper,2 ' suggests the strict requisites which courts will demand
in this situation. The applicant must do more than receive approval of
his subdivision plat by a county planning commission and county engineer to vest his rights in the use of the land before a zoning change. In
fact, in this case the applicant went so far as to complete the installation
of the sanitary system, but the court still refused to accept his argument
that his rights were vested. The court did imply by way of dictum that
had residences been built on this land prior to the zoning change, a nonhave been recognized, and the applicant could
conforming use would
22
relief.
obtained
have
These cases should serve as a warning to lawyers, builders, and construction companies alike. If the formal requirements to obtain a building permit are not strictly followed by an applicant, his rights to the use
of the land will not vest, resulting in a possible loss of money and time.
Tort Liability of a Municipality
Tort Liability -

ProprietaryFunction

The general rule is that the construction of sewers is a governmental
function and a municipality is therefore not liable for damages resulting
from improper construction. Conversely, the maintenance of sewers is a
proprietary function in the exercise of which a municipality is liable for
damages resulting from the negligence of its employees.2" The question
becomes difficult when the courts are presented with determining
whether the municipality was negligent in the construction or in the repair of the sewer. This problem was present but overlooked by the court
in Ball v. Village of Reynoldsburg.24
In this case the plaintiff contended that an eight-inch sewer line installed by the village was insufficient to handle the sewage because of
recent building developments. This overloading resulted in the back-up
of sewage in the plaintiff's basement causing considerable damage.
The court of appeals ignored the defendant village's contention that it
had not authorized the overloading of the sewer and held that an affirmative act is not always necessary in order to create liability against a municinonconforming use. There is a hint of this reasoning in the Mar-Well case. 113 Ohio App.
118, 124, 177 N.E.2d 515, 520 (1960).
21. 113 Ohio App. 375, 174 N.E.2d 271 (1961).
22. Id. at 379, 174 N.E.2d at 274.
23. For a general discussion of this problem, see FARRELL, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN
OHIO § 15.13, at 273-74 (1955); RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 30-23, at 769-73 (1957). The
multiplicity of rules and variety of rationale used by the courts of all states indicate the confusion present in this area.
24. 176 N.E.2d 739 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
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pal corporation. The court continued by saying that liability resulted in
this case because the municipal corporation failed to maintain an adequate system.25
The question which remains unanswered in this area is whether the
village was negligent in failing to install a larger sewer at the time of
construction or negligent in failing to maintain a sewer sufficient to
handle the problem. The courts have ignored this distinction, a distinction which seems important because the municipality is not liable for
negligent installation but is liable for negligent repair. The courts are
faced with a dilemma when required to define construction and maintenance, for liability will rest upon a determination of this issue. This
entire problem is the result of the irrational general rule relating to the
municipality's duty to construct and maintain a sewage system. The case
has significance in this era of numerous building developments with their
foreseeable sewage problems.
Tort Liability -

Defect in a Sidewalk

The confusion in the area of municipal liability for defects in sidewalks results from the decisions in Kimball v. City of Cincinnati," and
Griffin v. City of Cincnnati. The recent case of Reeves v. City of
Springfield28 does not solve the problem. In the instant case the plaintiff was injured when she tripped in a two to three inch hole in the sidewalk of the municipality. The Court of Appeals for Clark County analyzed the recent Ohio cases and affirmed the lower court's decision denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The court interpreted the
Kimball case as holding that there was no definite variation in the height
of a defect which classified it as a defect as a matter of law or a defect
that must be submitted to the jury. This interpretation is questionable
25. Id. at 740.
26. 160 Ohio St. 370, 116 N..2d 708 (1953). Here the Ohio Supreme Court reversed
the lower court, holding that the defect did not constitute a nuisance under Ohio Revised Code
section 723.01, and sustained a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the city. The court
quoted from the New York Court of Appeals decision in Gastel v. New York, 194 N.Y. 15,
86 N.E. 833 (1909), where it was held, as a matter of law, that any defect under four inches
was not a nuisance.
27. 162 Ohio St. 232, 123 N.E.2d 11 (1954). The court repudiated a great deal of its
opinion in the Kimball case. Here it was held that a two-inch defect did not constitute a
nuisance, but the lower court would -notrule as a matter of law and submitted the case to a
jury. Although the municipality was exonerated from liability by the jury, the supreme
court's affirmance of the jury's verdict, rather than affirming as a matter of law, represented
a change in approach from that taken in the Kimball case.
However, since the decision in the Griffin case, the Supreme Court of Ohio has apparently
reaffirmed its decision in the Kimball case. See, e.g., Amos v. City of Cleveland Heights,
169 Ohio St. 367, 159 N.E.2d 895 (1959); Kindle v. City of Akron, 169 Ohio St. 373, 159
NY-2d 764 (1959).
28. 111 Ohio App. 387, 171 N.E.2d 175 (1960). A motion to certify to the supreme court
was overruled on October 5, 1960.

